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The  relationship  between  the  degree  of  religiosity  and  economic  development  is 
empirically  investigated  for  a  cross-section  of  all  Turkish  cities  with  municipal 
authorities.  It is found that economic development and the degree of religiosity have a 
non-linear relationship.  Religiosity increases with industrialization first, however, as 
the industrialization increases more, the degree of religiosity decreases.  Coastal towns 
are less religious.  Mosques and schools are complements rather than substitutes as they 
affect  each  other  positively.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  the  ideological  competition 
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Introduction  
This paper investigates population and development elasticity of religiosity of a cross-
section of all Turkish cities with municipal authorities.  Villages are excluded from the 
sample  since  data  are  not  available  for  them.    Investigating  the  determinants  of 
religiosity at the aggregate city level is not a worthless endeavor since scholars from 
different disciplines try to understand the sources of degree of religiosity, especially 
after the September 11 attacks.  Religiosity of a particular city in this paper is measured 
by the number of mosques in total number of all buildings in that city.  Only mosques 
are included in the analysis here since there is very small number of religious buildings 
related to other religions in only small number of cities in Turkey.  Therefore, this is an 
aggregate economic analysis of mosques in the city level.  It can be argued that the 
number  of  mosques  themselves  might  not  necessarily  be  a  good  measure  of  how 
religious a community is if mosques are almost always empty.  Even if it is so, since 
mosques are built by donations of either individuals or non-governmental organizations 
and  land  is  a  relatively  expensive  factor  in  Turkey,  mosque  financiers  still  have  a 
perception that society/community values the mosques more or they have the intention 
of making people more religious (religious propaganda or ideological competition with 
secularists  in  Turkey)  if  mosques  are  chosen  among  alternatives  like  schools,  sport 
centers, cultural centers, etc.    Therefore, it would not be wrong to have the number of 
mosques  as  a  measure  of  religiosity.  In  fact,  popular  discussions  among  different 
political circles in Turkey often cite the number of mosques as a measure of religiosity.  
This  paper  investigates  the  two  elasticities  mentioned  in  the  first  sentence  of 
introduction section since there is a popular understanding in Turkey, and in many other 
circles in different countries in this matter, that economic development reduces the need 
for religious services or religiosity.  The assumed link from economic development to 
reduced  religious  services,  as  theory  suggests,  is  the  modernization.  Modern 
societies/communities, as opposed to traditional societies/communities, are assumed to 
be less religious or have more secularization (Giddens,1993; Martin,1978) even though 
the USA does not confirm this explanation, Verweij et al. (1997).  Modernization theory 
states that increasing modernization leads to the process by  which religion loses its 
social significance in human behavior (Wilson, 1982).  The modernization process is 
characterized as development which marks the transition from agrarian or traditional 
economy into large scale industrial or commercial economy, Verweij et al. (1997).  It is 
claimed  that  industrialization  and  commercialization  make  people  more  worldly 
(secular).    Some  scientist,  however,  discussed  that  modernization  theory  should  be 
abandoned completely since it is simple wrong.  They claim that modernization of USA 
does  not  reduce  the  degree  of  religiosity  of  people  in  that  country  as  the  church 
attendance rate is all time high in the 1990s as the issue is discussed in great detail in 
Stark and Iannaccone (1994). 
This paper therefore explicitly tests this popular perception that modernization reduces 
the  degree  of  religiosity  of  a  society  as  the  issue  is  not  exhaustively  empirically 
investigated, under the condition that economic development is assumed to transform 
the societies from traditional ones into modern ones.  This paper is organized as follows. 
The next section reviews the related literature.  Section III defines the data and gives 
some  descriptive  statistic  and  section  IV  gives  the  estimation  results.    Section  V 
concludes the paper.  International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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Literature Review 
Studies of religion and economics are analyzed and summarized in Iannaccone (1998).  
It is mainly mentioned three lines of inquiry: microeconomic determinants of religious 
behavior,  economic  consequences  of  religion,  and  religious  economics,  which  is 
primarily about economic policies from a religious perspective like Islamic banking and 
taxation as specific examples of the research.  Recently, the literature about economics 
of  religion  focuses  more  on  the  first  two  lines.      Papers  about  the  microeconomic 
determinants  of  religious  behavior  use  the  degree  of  religiosity  as  the  dependent 
variables and different economic variables as the independent variables (Verweij et al., 
1997; Smith et al. 1998; Smith and Sawkins, 2003; McCleary and Barro, 2006; Arano 
and Blair, 2007; Lopez and Santos, 2008).  Papers about economic consequences of 
religion  investigate  different  religions  and  their  effects  on  economic  growth  and 
development. This branch of the literature uses the Weber (Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism) work as an inspiring paper (Grier, 1997; Blum and Dudley, 2001, 
208; Guiso et al. 2002; Barro and McCleary, 2003; Montalvo and Reynol-Querol, 2003, 
202;  Noland,  2005;  Cavalcanti  et  al.  2007,106).  In  addition  to  these  ‘direction  of 
causation’  studies,  recently  some  papers  are  investigating  the  political  results  of 
religious behaviors as MacCulloch and Pezzini (2007) states that revolutionary rise in a 
country  can  be  offset  by  belonging  to  a  religion  which  lowers  the  probability  of 
revolution by between 1.8 and 2.7 percentage points.  Another paper by Lehrer (2004) 
investigates the role of religion in union formation.   
The already existing studies have the following features.  
-They are mostly using different kinds of survey data sets for religiosity and other social 
attitudes like World Values Survey (WVS), General Social Surveys (GSS), International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP), and other surveys.  
-Most of them are cross-country studies.  
-Most of the studies are about developed countries since data are usually unavailable for 
developing countries.  
This  paper,  however,  is  contributing  to  existing  literature  from  several  dimensions:  
First of all, this study uses a novel data set of all existing buildings in use for all the 
cities (both small and large) with municipal authorities.  The data set is prepared by the 
Turkish Statistical  Institution (TSI). Secondly, this paper is about a cross-section of 
cities in a relatively homogeneous country, Turkey.  Turkey is 99.8 % Muslim (Sunni), 
0.2  %  Christians,  Jews,  and  other  religions
1.      Cross-country  studies  about  the 
relationships between economic growth/development and religiosity might have some 
problems in especially determining the effects of religion on growth since growth of 
different countries might be affected by other several cultural variables than religion. In 
addition to that, data about religiosity of different countries are including a vast array of 
subjectivity of surveys.  Thirdly, this study is about a developing country. In addition, 
this study is the first study of its kind in Turkey. In fact, this data set, to the best of our 
knowledge, has not been used in another paper.    
                                                 
1 CIA Factbooks.  International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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Investigating the relationship between religious and other economic and social variables 
by the tools of economics is a relatively new topic in economics.  The relationship 
between  cultural  and  religious  factors  and  economic  well  being  or  economic 
development is recently being paid more attention, especially after the September 11 
2001 attack to Twin Towers in New York City as mentioned before in the introduction 
section. The main motivation of this paper is to contribute to this literature.  This paper 
investigates the population and development elasticity of religiosity. Therefore, the size 
of religious services (the degree of religiosity) is assumed to be in a relation with the 
size of population and the level of economic development.  
Population can serve two purposes to test: first, in the cities with higher population, the 
cost per capita of the services would be smaller if there is increasing returns to scale 
with  respect  to  religious  services,  which  mostly  show  public  good  features.    As  is 
known, public goods highly likely show the feature of increasing returns to scale as 
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) showed it in a different context of public expenditures.  
As an example, a mosque except for Fridays, where some congestion effect reveals, is a 
public  good  since  it  is  nonexcludable  and  nonrival.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  more 
populated the city, the smaller the cost of religious services per capita, mainly cost of 
building the mosque since imams are getting paid by government but mosques are being 
built by nongovernmental organizations or individuals in Turkey.  Second, cities with 
higher population are relatively culturally more heteregenous cities than the cities with 
smaller population.  In more heteregenous cities, there would be two types of social 
behavior in terms of financing religious services or participation to religious services.   
The first, different groups of people try to free ride, in which case, supply of services of 
public good per capita would be smaller if the income or wealth is distributed relatively 
evenly.    If  the  income  distribution  is  relatively  bad,  then  this  outcome  would  not 
necessarily have to be observed since some religious wealthy people alone can take the 
financial burden of the religious services, mainly building the mosques.   As a related 
observation, it should be mentioned here that small towns have relatively better income 
distribution than big cities have in Turkey even though big cities have a higher income 
per capita.  As a second observation, most mosques are built on land which is donated 
by wealthy people in Turkey.  Donations by the attendees of the mosques are mostly 
used for maintenance of the mosques.  
The second, cultural heterogeneity would make the citizens of the city more or less open 
minded or less or more conservative respectively. If cultural heterogeneity makes the 
citizens more open minded or less  conservative, religious public services per  capita 
would be smaller in more populated cities. If, on the contrary, cultural heterogeneity 
makes the citizens of the city less open minded or more conservative, religious public 
services per capita would be higher in more populated cities.   
What  would  be  the  final  effect  of  population  on  religious  services  depends  on  the 
dominating  factors.    Which  effects  would  be  eventually  prevailing  is  an  empirical 
question  since  theoretically  all  possible  three  types  of  behavior  are  likely  to  be 
observable.  
The level of development can also affect the religiosity of societies or individuals. As 
the literature is reviewed briefly above, the relationship between economic and socio 
political developments and degree of religiosity is investigated in the literature in some International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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detail (Mangeloja 2005, 2350; McCleary and Barro, 2006, 150; Arano and Blair, 2007). 
The direction of causality is usually one of the main concerns in most of the research in 
this field.  One way of directions is from the development to religiosity and the other 
way  is  the  reverse.    Development,  it  is  claimed  in  the  literature  reviewed  above, 
increases industrialization and therefore secularization or decreased level of religiosity. 
However, this may not be the only outcome of development.  Development can cause a 
religious  market  competition  since  different  sects  or  denominations  might  have  the 
resources to compete. This market structure and government regulation of it can affect 
the  degree  of  religiosity.  In  short,  development  can  also  increase  the  degree  of 
religiosity. This issue is entirely an empirical one.  The degree of religiosity can affect 
the development and growth as well, the reverse causation. More religious communities, 
as is discussed in the literature, can develop a social trust among themselves to do better 
business.  In other words, higher level of religiosity can increase the social capital and 
therefore economic growth and development. This issue is also entirely empirical one 
since different countries or societies can respond this relationship differently. Therefore, 
there is a huge need for more empirical studies for different societies or countries.  
Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The domain of the empirical study is the cross section of the Turkish cities. Provinces 
(il), towns (ilce), and small towns (belde) are used in the study. There are 81 provinces, 
850 towns, and 2267 small towns in Turkey. Villages are excluded from the study due 
to non availability of the data.   
In terms of the variables in the empirical models here, first type of public good is the 
number of mosques in total building. That is, mosques and mescits, smaller and easy-
built (sometimes an apartment can be used as a mescit) versions of mosques. There is 
some small number of churches in some of the major cities. However, their statistical 
effects are ignorable since almost all of the religious buildings are mosques or mescits. 
The second type of public goods is the number of buildings for educational and cultural 
use in total number of all buildings. These different buildings and their use are defined 
below.      Aggregate  wealth  per  capita  of  the  city  is  proxied  by  total  number  of  all 
buildings per person.  The building classification in Table 1 below is using international 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
    Pop.  Res.  Com.  Ind.  Educul.  Health  Gov.  Rel.  Agri.  total 
Provinces  mean  255954.26  25308.98  2133.18  868.16  112.03  70.58  140.66  83.64  92.01  32223.94 
  std  453238.40  41058.45  3051.18  1809.52  177.56  122.20  277.45  96.50  147.93  52144.71 
  max  3168054.00  246231.00  15924.00  9484.00  1325.00  914.00  2221.00  562.00  930.00  301642.00 
  min  17274.00  1487.00  94.00  2.00  16.00  6.00  10.00  3.00  1.00  2665.00 
Towns  mean  28336.76  2902.85  273.64  61.88  15.93  9.03  17.14  13.86  73.66  3930.31 
  std  67691.67  4627.83  523.71  141.43  20.81  14.88  25.62  17.72  156.51  6143.76 
  max  663299.00  43799.00  9583.00  1547.00  270.00  183.00  496.00  209.00  1960.00  56484.00 
  min  683.00  72.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  115.00 
Small 
Towns 
mean  4191.17  639.53  33.66  13.05  3.78  2.78  3.87  4.10  64.22  888.35 
  std  5526.08  808.50  74.97  54.68  2.83  6.49  12.90  3.24  103.14  918.02 
  max  148981.00  15509.00  1380.00  1475.00  38.00  217.00  536.00  33.00  1298.00  18954.00 
  min  858.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  156.00 
Pop.: Population, Res.: Residential Buildings, Com.: Building for commercial use, Ind.: Building for 
industrial use, Educul.: Building for educational and cultural use like schools, private tutoring institutions, 
all the schools related buildings like sports centers, school cafeteria, dormitories, etc. Health: building for 
health, social and sportive use, Gov.: Government buildings, Rel.: Buildings for religious use (mosques, 
smaller mescits), Agri.: Building for agricultural use, total: total buildings in a particular city.  
The Model and Results of Regressions  
The first model to estimate  
i i i Z Y e g + =                       (1) 
Where the dependent variable is the number of mosques in total number of all buildings 
in a given city, independent variables are population, industrialization, level of wealth, 
and educational and cultural use buildings in the total number of all buildings along 
with several dummy variables. Level of wealth is measured by total number of buildings 
per capita. Eq. 1 is estimated by OLS and 2SLS to account for endogeneity with all 
variables in the system as instrumental variables. The results of these regressions are 
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Table 2: Religiosity and Development 
  Dependent  Variable:  Number  of 
religious buildings in total number 
of buildings  
Dependent  Variable:  Number  of 
religious buildings in total number 
of buildings 
            Regression 1:  OLS              Regression 2: 2SLS 
  Coefficient                  t-stat  Coefficient                  t-stat 
constant  -2.88***  -19.48  -2.99***  -19.83 
Population  -0.16***  -11.73  -0.18***  -12.19 
Industrialization   0.02***  2.70  0.02**  2.37 
Industrialization
2  -0.004**  -2.10  -0.004*  -1.89 
Wealth  -0.23***  -6.48  -0.35***  -7.28 
Building for educational and 
cultural use in total buildings  
0.23***  10.12  0.20***  8.85 
Coastal towns  -0.24***  -5.98  -0.22***  -5.52 
Aegean   -0.39***  -9.28  -0.37***  -8.65 
Mediterranean  -0.26***  -5.81  -0.26***  -5.82 
Marmara  -0.63***  -14.03  -0.62***  -13.59 
East Anatolia  -0.38***  -7.40  -0.40***  -7.64 
Central Anatolia  -0.27***  -7.19  -0.27***  -7.20 
South East Anatolia  -0.38***  -6.47  -0.40***  -6.88 
Adj-R
2  0.31  0.31 
Observations  2297  2297 
*** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, *p<0.10, 
 Industrialization=((Buildings for industrial use+ buildings for commercial use)/ buildings for agricultural 
use) 
Wealth:  Total  buildings/population.    Regional  dummies:  Aegean,  Mediterranean,  Marmara,  East 
Anatolia, Central Anatolia,  South East Anatolia, Black Sea. 
 
All the variables except for dummy variables are in their natural logarithms. According 
to Table 2 there is a non linear relationship between industrialization and the degree of 
religiosity in Turkish cities. At the beginning level of industrialization, the degree of 
religiosity  is  increasing;  however,  as  the  industrialization  increases  eventually  the 
degree of religiosity is decreasing.  There is also a negative relationship between wealth 
and the degree of religiosity: as wealth increases, the degree of religiosity decreases.   
These results here are confirming the secularization hypothesis of modernization theory.  
As industrialization and wealth increase, the religiosity decreases.  We can not test for 
religious competition in this paper as it is tested for many other countries (Smith and 
Sawkins, 2003; Lopez and Santos, 2008) since majority of the population is Muslim and 
Sunni. Therefore, there is no competition between different religions and/or different 
denominations  or  sects.  There  is  however  a  highly  likely  ideological  competition 
between religious communities and secularists.  The results of the regressions of eq.1 
indicate  that  educational  and  cultural  buildings  in  total  buildings  are  positively 
significantly affecting the religiosity.  That is, if a city relatively to other cities has a 
higher ratio of cultural and educational buildings in total buildings, that city has also 
higher ratio of mosques to total buildings. This can be interpreted as the existence of 
ideological  competition  between  secularists  and  religious  communities  in  a  city  if 
mosques  and  educational  and  cultural  buildings  are  not  being  funded  by  the  same 
people.  As is known very well that mosques are being built by individuals or non-
governmental  institutions,  schools  (educational  buildings)  or  cultural  buildings  are 
being built by government.  The regression is controlled for population and wealth.  
Coefficient of population is negative and significant, showing that crowded cities are 
less  religious.  Different  links  of  population  variable  as  defined  above  can  not  be International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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disaggregated into different variables since data are not available. It is very interesting 
to observe that coastal towns which are tourism towns are less religious or the degree of 
religiosity for those towns is smaller compared to other towns.   Tourism promotes non-
religious business opportunities and makes people more open minded and secular.  
In order to address the endogeneity problem, eq.1 is run by 2SLS. The results of 2SLS 
are also reported in Table 2. The results of regression 2 are very similar to those of 
regression 1.  
In  order  to  be  able  to  investigate  the  ideological  competition  between  schools  and 
mosques, eq. 2 below  is run by a system of equations.  The system estimation is done 








i Y X Y e a b + + = 1 2 2  
Where
  i y1 is the natural logarithm of percentage of mosques in total number of all 
buildings and 
i y2 is the natural logarithm of percentage of educational and cultural 
buildings in total number of all buildings Zi  and Xi re vectors of independent variables, 
 and  are vectors of unknown parameters and  and. vi are error terms. 
Table 3: System Estimation 
  Dependent  Variable:  Number  of 
religious buildings in total number 
of buildings  
Dependent  Variable:  Number  of 
cultural  and  educational  buildings  in 
total number of buildings 
  Estimation method: 3SLS 
  First equation in the system         Second equation in the system 
  Coefficient   t-stat  Coefficient   t-stat 
Constant  -2.91***  -19.62  -3.64***  -28.21 
Population  -0.18***  -11.15  -0.13***  -9.84 
Industrialization  0.02***  2.66  0.006  0.94 
Industrialization
2  -0.004**  -2.21     
Wealth  -0.32***  -6.80  -0.42***  -13.56 
Expenditures on education 
and culture (% in total) 
0.22***  10.22     
Coastal towns  -0.22***  -5.76  -0.14***  -3.71 
Number  of  religious 
buildings  in  total  number 
of buildings 
    0.22***  10.95 
Aegean   -0.37***  -8.57  -0.16***  -3.89 
Mediterranean  -0.26***  -5.75  -0.12***  -2.75 
Marmara  -0.61***  -13.86  -0.17***  -3.94 
East Anatolia  -0.40***  -8.15  0.14***  2.98 
Central Anatolia  -0.26***  -6.99  -0.13***  -3.57 
South East Anatolia  -0.39***  -5.75  -0.07  -1.08 
Adj-R
2  0.31  0.27 
Observations  2297  2297 
System Observations  4594 (Balanced System) 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
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Table 3 shows that the non-linear relationship between the degree of religiosity and 
industrialization is kept in system estimation as well.  All the variables are significant 
except for the industrialization variable in the second equation in the system.  Since 
schools are built by the government and it is exogenous to industrialization, it is not 
surprising that industrialization is not statistically significant.  Schools are built if there 
is enough population.  Industrialization is not required to build schools since children of 
the non-industrial cities also need to go to school and the government should provide 
schooling for them.   Table 3 indicates that schools and mosques are complement rather 
than  being  substitutes  since  they  affect  each  other  positively  and  significantly.      If 
schools and mosques are not funded by the same resources, this complementarity can be 
interpreted as ideological competition.  This is an interesting result since popular press 
discusses  the  ideological  competition  between  secularist  government  structure  and 
religious communities in Turkey.  This point, however, needs to be investigated with 
different type of disaggregated data, which is a subject of another paper.   
Conclusion 
This paper investigates empirically the relationship between the degree of religiosity 
and economic development for a cross section of Turkish cities.   Degree of religiosity 
is measured by the total number of mosques in total number of all buildings, whereas 
industrialization  is  measured  by  the  ratio  of  industrial  and  commercial  buildings  to 
agricultural buildings.  It is observed that there is a nonlinear relationship between the 
degree of religiosity and industrialization. As industrialization is increased a little, the 
degree of religiosity is also increased. Therefore, villagers are less religious than people 
who live medium size commercial cities, ceteris paribus. As industrialization increases 
more,  the  degree  of  religiosity  is  decreasing,  conforming  the  hypothesis  of 
modernization and secularization.  
Coastal towns are found to be less religious.  This is not surprising the coastal towns in 
Turkey are known culturally very liberal. Coastal towns are tourism towns and cultural 
very  diverse.  Cultural  diversity  might  reduce  the  neighborhood  pressure  to  practice 
religion. 
Another interesting finding is that mosques and schools are complement and there might 
be a ideological competition between secularists and religious communities.  
As a further research, a different type of data set is needed to investigate whether there 






 International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
 
  270 
References 
Alesina, A. and Wacziarg, R. (1998) Openness, country size, and government, Journal 
of Public Economics, 69, 305–21. 
Arano,  K.  G.  and  Blair,  B.  F.  (2007)  Modeling  religious  behavior  and  economic 
outcome:  Is  the  relationship  bicausal?  Evidence  from  a  survey  of  Mississippi 
households, The Journal of Socio-Economics, (Forthcoming). 
Barro,  R.  J.  and  McCleary  R.M.  (2003)  Religion  and  Economic  Growth,  American 
Sociological Review, 68, 760-781.  
Blum, U. and Dudley, L. (2001) Religion and Economic Growth: was Weber Right?, 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 11, 207-230.  
Cavalcanti,T.V.,    Parente,  S.L.  and  Zhao,R.  (2007)  Religion  in  macroeconomics:  A 
quantitative analysis of Weber’s thesis, Economic Theory, 32(1), 105-123. 
Giddens, A. (1993) Sociology, Oxford: Polity Press. 
Grier, R. (1997) The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross National 
Study of 63 Former Colonies, Kyklos, Vol. 50, Fasc.1, 47-62.  
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L.(2002) People’s Opium? Religion and Economic 
Attitudes, Working Paper 9237, http://www.nber.org/papers/w9237.  
Iannaccone, L.R. (1998) Introduction to the Economic of Religion, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. XXXVI, 1465-1496.  
Lehrer, E.L. (2004) The role of religion in union formation: An economic Perspective, 
Population Research and Policy Review, 23, 161-185. 
Lopez J.A.P. and Santos, J.M.S. (2008) Effects of competition on religious markets: 
some empirical evidence, Applied Economics Letters, 15, 371-374. 
MacCulloch, R. and  Pezzini, S. (2007)  Money, Religion and Revolution, Economics of 
Governance, 8, 1-16. 
Mangeloja, E. (2005) Economic Growth and Religious Production Efficiency, Applied 
Economics, 37, 2349-2359.  
Martin, D. (1978) A General Theory of Secularization, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
McCleary  R.M.  and  Barro  R.J.  (2006)  Religion  and  Political  Economy  in  an 
International Panel, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 45(2), 149-175.   
Noland, M. (2005) Religion and Economic Performance, World Development, Vol. 33, 
No.8, 1215-1232.   International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
 
  271 
Montalvo,  J.G.  and  Reynal-Querol,  M.  (2003)  Religious  Polarization  and  economic 
development, Economics Letters, 80, 201-210.  
Smith,  I.,  Sawkins,  J.W.  and  Seaman,    P.T.  (1998)  The  Economics  of  Religious 
Participation: A Cross-Country Study, Kyklos, Vol. 51, Fasc.1, 25-43. 
Smith, I. and Sawkins, J.W. (2003) The economics of regional variation in religious 
attendance, Applied Economics, 15, 1577-1588.  
Stark,  R.  and  IannacconeR.L.(1994)  A  Supply  Side  Reinterpretation  of  the 
Secularization of Europe, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,33(3), 230-252. 
Verweij, J., Ester, P. and Nauta, R. (1997) Secularization as an Economic and Cultural 
Phenomenon: A Cross-National Analysis, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 
36(2),309-324.   
Wilson,  B.  (1982)  Religion  in  Sociological  Perspective.  Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press.  
 
 
 
 